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Round-robin differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution (RRDPS QKD) has been proposed
to raise the noise tolerability of the channel. However, in practice, the measurement device in
RRDPS QKD may be imperfect. Here, we show that, with these imperfections, the security of
RRDPS may be damaged, by proposing two attacks for RRDPS systems with uncharacterized
measurement devices. One is valid even for a system with unit total efficiency, while the other is
valid even when a single photon state is sent. To prevent these attacks, either security arguments
need to be fundamentally revised or further practical assumptions on the measurement device should
be put.
Introduction. Quantum key distribution (QKD)
enables an information-theoretic secure way of shar-
ing a key between two distant parties Alice and Bob
[1, 2]. In QKD, Alice sends quantum signals to Bob
who measures to obtain raw keys. Due to distur-
bance in the channel or eavesdropping, the raw keys
might not be identical or secure. So Alice and Bob
perform error correction and privacy amplification to
recover secure identical keys. In traditional QKDs,
both error correction and privacy amplification costs
are estimated from the error rates in the channel,
which leads to an upper bound on the allowable er-
ror rate. For example, the error rate threshold for
the celebrated BB84 QKD protocol is 25% [1].
Recently, a QKD protocol, called round-robin
differential-phase-shift (RRDPS) QKD [3] is pro-
posed. This scheme and its passive equivalent
scheme [4], were proven to be secure even un-
der highly noisy channels, essentially removing the
bound on the error rate. This desired property is
achieved as they manage to directly compute the
privacy amplification cost characterized by the phase
error eph without estimating the disturbance in the
channel.
However, practical implementations of the
RRDPS schemes [4–7] may be imperfect. For ex-
ample, in the security proof of the RRDPS schemes
[3, 4], Bob’s measurement device is assumed to
be a well-defined projective measurement acting
on incoming single photon states. However, this
assumption may be spoiled in practice because
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current detectors can malfunction under bright
pulse illumination [5]. As another example, the
beam splitter in the measurement device is assumed
to have a transmission-reflection ratio of one half.
However, in practice the transmission-reflection
ratio of the beam splitter varies with different wave-
lengths and can thus be manipulated by adjusting
the wavelength [8].
In this work, we show that these imperfections
in the measurement device may call the security of
RRDPS into question. This is not obvious because
the key security argument of RRDPS protocol, is
that Alice’s key is completely determined by the
density matrix of her prepared state and Bob’s r
is chosen by himself instead of the measurement de-
vice. These are not changed when the measurement
device is imperfect. To model the imperfections, we
consider the worst case scenario that Bob’s measure-
ment device is untrusted, and then propose two at-
tacks to break the security. One must impose that
Bob’s untrusted measurement device cannot com-
municate the measured keys with the adversary Eve
outside Bob’s environment, because otherwise no se-
cure keys can be established. This can be done by,
e.g., putting a shield around Bob’s workstation.
In the following, we will first describe the un-
trusted measurement scenario in detail, and then de-
scribe our two attacks. Finally, we conclude with a
few interesting open questions.
Untrusted measurement RRDPS. In the original
RRDPS protocol, as shown in Fig. 1(a), Alice’s
preparation of random bits sequence s1, · · · , sL and
corresponding L-pulse state can be regarded as the
following operations equivalently. Alice firstly pre-
pares the quantum state
|Ψ〉1 =
1
2L/2
L∏
k=1
(|0〉k + (−1)nˆk |1〉k)|Ψ〉B, (1)
where |〉k represents Alice’s ancillary qubits, nˆk is
the photon number operator acting on |Ψ〉B , and
|Ψ〉B is the encoding state which will be sent to Bob
via a quantum channel. Alice’s bit sk can be viewed
as the output of Z basis measurement {|0〉〈0|, |1〉〈1|}
on ancilla |k〉. Next, Alice sends the quantum state
to Bob. Bob splits the input to two paths, applies
a random delay r to one of the paths, obtains i,
j = i + r, si ⊕ sj through detectors’ outcomes and
announces i and j to Alice. On receiving i and j,
Alice performs a controlled-NOT gate to her ancilla
|〉i and |〉j , in which |〉i is the control qubit while |〉j
is the target. Then Alice can measure |〉j with the
Z basis to obtain her sifted key bit si ⊕ sj .
FIG. 1. (a) Original RRDPS [3]. Alice sends a pulse
train to Bob, who splits the pulse train into two paths,
adds a delay r to one of the paths, measures the inter-
ference to obtain si ⊕ sj , i, j, and publicly announces i,
j. (b) Untrusted measurement variant. Instead of per-
forming the operations himself, Bob gives an untrusted
measurement device, Fred, the pulse train along with a
random r, and Fred outputs si⊕sj , i, j = i+r. One pos-
sible implementation of Fred could be exactly the same
as the corresponding part of the original RRDPS.
When the measurement is untrusted, as shown in
Fig. 1(b), Alice prepares the same state and sends
it to Bob. After receiving the incoming state, Bob
inputs a random delay value r to his untrusted de-
vice, obtains i, j (j − i = r), and an estimated value
of si ⊕ sj . The rest procedures are the same, where
Bob publicly announces i, j and Alice performs the
controlled-NOT gate accordingly. Here untrusted
means that Bob’s device is an unknown quantum
measurement device, called Fred, which could be
manufactured by the adversary Eve. We assume
here that Fred cannot actively disclose any infor-
mation outside of Bob’s environment bypassing Bob
(e.g. by sending light signals). This assumption in
particular eliminates the possibility of Fred telling
Eve, who is outside, the measurement result si ⊕ sj
because Bob never announces it.
Proposed attack 1. Before describing the first at-
tack, we settle down some useful notations. For a
function f(n), Θ(f(n)) stands for a function g(n)
which satisfies c1f(n) ≤ g(n) ≤ c2f(n) for some con-
stants c1, c2 independent of n, while ω(f(n)) stands
for a function g(n) which satisfies g(n) > cf(n) for
any constant c.
The key idea of the attack is that Eve and Fred
can cooperate to announce the (i, j) pair. This is
fundamentally different from the original RRDPS.
To see the difference, examine the following exam-
ple. Suppose the range of i, j is {1, 2, 3, 4}. In the
original RRDPS, Eve chooses i. Then Bob chooses
a random j 6= i and thus has three choices of j.
However, when Bob’s measurement device is held
by another adversary Fred who cooperates with Eve,
the adversaries could restrict the (i, j) pair output to
(1, 2), (1, 4), (2, 4). For any i that can be announced,
j only has two choices and thus not uniformly ran-
dom anymore.
The setting of the attack is as follows. The pulse
train contains n pulses and Alice sends a pulse train
containing (n − 1)/2 photons. Note that according
to the state preparation of RRDPS, each photon is
in the state
|ψ〉 = 1√
n
n∑
i=1
(−1)si |i〉 (2)
Eve first splits these (n−1)/2 photons and performs
a passive interference with each photon. Then Eve
obtains the relative phases of (n−1)/2 random pairs
of (i, j), with details in Appendix A.
A critical property of the relative phase is its tran-
sitivity. This can be easily shown as follows. If both
si ⊕ sj and sj ⊕ sk are known, then
si ⊕ sk = (si ⊕ sj)⊕ (sj ⊕ sk) (3)
is also known. For ease of presentation, we construct
a graph with n nodes corresponding to the n pulses
in the pulse train. If Eve detects the relative phase
of (i, j), add an edge between node i and j. Then
by the aforementioned property, if node i and node
k can be connected by a path of nodes, their relative
phase is known. Furthermore, by a well-known ran-
dom graph result [9], since each edge appears with
2
probability
p =
n−1
2(
n
2
) = 1
n
. (4)
there exists a connected component of size Θ(n2/3).
Thus the relative phases between the Θ(n2/3) nodes
in this connected component are all known by Eve.
For a moderate size of n = 1000, simulations show
that with p = 1/40 edge probability, there exists a
connected component of size at least 200 at a 99%
confidence level.
Eve proceeds to send the corresponding indices of
these m = Θ(n2/3) nodes and their phases to Fred.
Denote the indices as a1, . . . , am. By calculations of
the probability in Appendix B, we show that with
probability approaching 1, {|ai − aj |, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n}
will contain almost all numbers in the set {1, · · · , n−
1}. For a moderate size m = 200 and n = 1000,
simulations show that at a 99% confidence level, at
least 95% of elements in {1, · · · , n − 1} appear as
differences of ai. Thus when Bob inputs a delay r to
Fred, he could announce a corresponding pair ai, aj
such that
|ai − aj | = r, (5)
and also outputs sai ⊕ saj to Bob. However, since
ai, aj are publicly announced, Eve, who is outside
Bob’s environment, can also recover sai ⊕ saj per-
fectly without causing any disturbance.
Finally, we note that, if some delay r is absent,
Fred could announce loss when Bob inputs this r. So
in the asymptotic limit, the existence of a majority
of delays from {1, · · · , n−1} could already guarantee
Fred to output with almost unit probability.
Now we turn to the implications of this attack.
Let us examine the phase error formula for RRDPS
protocol. In the original work [3], the phase error
formula is eph = nph/(L−1), where L is the number
of pulses in the pulse train and nph is the number of
photons that Alice sends. We plug in nph = (n−1)/2
and L = n and get eph = 1/2. This means that there
are no secure keys and does not contradict with the
fact that Eve has obtained all the information that
Alice and Bob share.
However, the phase error in the original paper is
not tight. Indeed, the phase error is later improved
[4, 10] and is given by eph = [1 − (1 − 2/L)nph]/2.
The improvement relies on the fact that when Eve
chooses i and Bob chooses a random j 6= i for multi-
ple photons, an phase error happens only with an
odd number of photons. By plugging in nph =
(n−1)/2 and L = n, we have eph = (1−1/e)/2 when
n is large. This implies that secure keys can be gen-
erated and a contradiction occurs. This shows that
in the untrusted measurement setting, with even
unit efficiency, careful study of the phase error is
needed since the model is no longer equivalent to the
original RRDPS protocol. Through the proposed at-
tack, Eve can learn key bits without introducing any
additional error rates. In the following, we propose
another attack, in which Eve can learn key bits with
the help of additional error rates when total loss is
larger than 3dB.
Proposed attack 2. In the second attack, Eve and
Fred will obtain Alice’s key bit with certainty, but
introduce 50% bit error rate and 50% channel loss
between Alice and Bob.
Consider Alice prepares the following single pho-
ton encoding state
|Ψ〉1 =
1√
L
(eiα1 |1〉1|0〉2|0〉3 · · · |0〉L
+ eiα2 |0〉1|1〉2|0〉3 · · · |0〉L
+ eiα3 |0〉1|0〉2|1〉3 · · · |0〉L
+ ...
+ eiαL |0〉1|0〉2|0〉3 · · · |1〉L).
(6)
Then Eve launches an attack in the following way:
|Ψ〉2 =
1√
L
(eiα1 |1〉1|0〉2|0〉3 · · · |0〉L|1〉E
+ eiα2 |0〉1|1〉2|0〉3 · · · |0〉L|2〉E
+ eiα3 |0〉1|0〉2|1〉3 · · · |0〉L|3〉E
+ ...
+ eiαL |0〉1|0〉2|0〉3 · · · |1〉L|L〉E),
(7)
where, |n〉E is the ancilla of Eve and E〈n|m〉E =
δmn. Eve sends this ancilla E to Bob’s device (Fred)
and retains Alice’s encoding state |〉1|〉2...|〉L in her
quantum memory. Fred simply measures E ac-
cording to Bob’s input r. For example, if r = 1,
Fred measures E with the basis (|1〉E ± |2〉E , |2〉E ±|3〉E , ...), which is the same as the r-delay interfer-
ence and will output a pair of i and j definitely. If
Fred obtains |i〉E + |j〉E , Fred will inform Bob the i,
j, and a random key bit. If Fred obtains |i〉E−|j〉E ,
Fred will inform Bob that there is no click in this
run. For instance, Fred observes (|1〉E + |2〉E) in
this run, then Alice’s encoding state becomes
3
|Ψ〉3 =
1√
2
(eiα1 |1〉1|0〉2|0〉3|0〉L
+ eiα2 |0〉1|1〉2|0〉3|0〉L).
(8)
Since this state is retained by Eve, she can learn
Alice’s sifted key bit α1 ⊕ α2 easily. Though this
attack introduces high error rate, it implies that
the security of RRDPS in the untrusted measure-
ment scenario will depend on the error rate, which is
completely different from original RRDPS protocol.
Hence, one may conjecture that Eve’s information on
key bits depends on the error rate in the untrusted
measurement setting, while the original RRDPS pro-
tocol features that monitoring signal disturbance is
not necessary for placing a bound on Eve’s informa-
tion.
The error rate 50% can be reduced by mixing
performing and not performing this attack together
with probability 1/2 each. Then the error rate drops
to 25%, while the same feature, channel-dependent
phase error, still holds. Hence, when Bob’s device
is untrusted, the RRDPS protocol is not secure and
monitoring signal disturbance would be necessary.
This finding may shed lights on the future security
proof of RRDPS in untrusted measurement scenario.
Discussion. In summary, we have shown that the
security of RRDPS protocol can be damaged when
the measurement device is not perfect and conse-
quently does not satisfy the assumptions of the pro-
tocol. We prove this by giving two concrete attacks
for RRDPS with completely untrusted measurement
device. In addition to showing a warning sign for the
trustworthiness of the measurement device, our work
raises two interesting questions:
The first question is how to prove the security of
RRDPS with untrusted measurement. Our result
shows that in the untrusted measurement setting,
the security analysis is significantly different from
the original RRDPS, and thus calls for more scrutiny
in the analysis of the untrusted measurement setting.
We show in Appendix C that it can be proven to be
secure in the perfect case where there is no error and
no loss. We therefore conjecture that it could also
be made secure under a general lossy and erroneous
channel when one correctly characterizes the infor-
mation leakage. But the security proof may require
transforming the experiment setup to a completely
different intermediate model.
The second question is motivated by the fact that
our untrusted measurement assumption may not be
satisfied by a current-technology-hackable measure-
ment device. Hence, it is interesting to see how our
attacks can be modified and implemented on a cur-
rent experimental RRDPS setup.
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Appendix A: Passive interference
In the passive interference, Eve prepares a super-
posed state with plain phases,
|ψ0〉 = 1√
n
n∑
i=1
|i〉, (A1)
and interferes with Alice’s photon with a beam split-
ter which results in a mixture of the two click events
[4],
[1 + (−1)si+sj ]cicj , [1− (−1)si+sj ]cidj (A2)
where ci denotes the first detector clicks at the i-th
time and dj denotes the second detector clicks at
the j-th time. Thus by examining whether the two
clicks are from the same detector or from different
detectors, Eve can determine the value of si⊕ sj for
a random pair (i, j).
Appendix B: Equidistribution of differences
In this section, we will prove a technical result
which is involved in the attack analysis, namely
lim
n→∞
E
[
#{|ai − aj|, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m}
n
]
= 1, (B1)
where m = Θ(n2/3) and a1, · · · , am are chosen at
random from {1, . . . , n}. Actually we will prove a
stronger result which replaces m = Θ(n2/3) by m =
ω(
√
n). It is stronger because if the conclusion holds
for a specific m, it naturally also holds for bigger
m. The conclusion is intuitively true because ω(
√
n)
numbers have more than(
2
√
n
2
)
> n (B2)
differences and these differences have sufficient ran-
domness in {0, . . . , n− 1}.
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Now let us start the proof. First fix a constant
ǫ > 0. Let A = {ai : i < m/2} ∩ {1, · · · , ǫn}. In
expectation, A contains ǫm/2 = ω(n) elements. By
concentration, we have |A| ≥ √n with high proba-
bility.
Now suppose that |A| ≥ √n holds, i.e., there are√
n distinct values in {1, · · · , ǫn} for the first m/2
elements. Then for the last m/2 elements, they are
independent and each element has probability
√
n/n
to be distance d away from some element in A for
any d ∈ [1, n − ǫn]. Thus the probability that none
of the last m/2 elements are distance d from some
element in A is (1− 1/√n)m/2, which vanishes as n
goes to infinity.
So, using linearity of expectation for all d ∈ [1, n−
ǫn], we have
lim
n→∞
E
[
#{|ai − aj |, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m}
n
]
≥ 1− ǫ, (B3)
for any ǫ > 0. Since ǫ can be arbitrarily small, our
result holds and the proof is complete.
Remark. Note that m = ω(
√
n) is actually tight.
One cannot hope to improve the bound to m =
Ω(
√
n). The reason is as follows. Suppose there
is some constant c such that m = c
√
n, then in
[1, n/c3] and [n − n/c3, n], about 2√n/c2 numbers
are selected. Then differences in [n − n/c3, n] will
appear for about n/c4 times. Thus when n → ∞,
the upper bound on the expectation value of the
number of differences dividing n is 1 − 1/c3 + 1/c4,
not 1.
Appendix C: Security for the perfect case
For simplicity, we consider the case that L = 3
in this proof, since this proof can cover larger L
cases easily. And only collective attack is consid-
ered here. Alice’s encoding state can be written as
|Ψ〉 = (−1)k1 |1〉+(−1)k2 |2〉+(−1)k3 |3〉. Besides no
loss and error, we also assume that for the events
that Fred outputs i, j, Alice finds that kl(l 6= i, j)
have equal 0s and 1s conditioned on (ki, kj) = (a, b)
for all a, b ∈ {0, 1}.
The general collective attack model is that Eve
applies a unitary transformation UE to the traveling
photon and her ancilla |E〉. Note that after Eve’s op-
eration UE , the incoming photon will be transformed
to an unknown and arbitrary information carrier, la-
beled as |F 〉, sent to Fred. Then depends on Bob’s
input r, Fred uses unitary transformation U
(r)
F act-
ing |F 〉 to generate |i〉+(−1)ki⊕ki |j〉 to Bob. When
Fred generates |1〉± |2〉, the density matrix of |E〉 is
given by
ρE =
∑
k3
tr[(|1〉〈1|+ |2〉〈2|)
P{UE((−1)k1 |1〉+ (−1)k2 |2〉+ (−1)k3 |3〉)
|E〉|F 〉}]
= tr[(|1〉〈1|+ |2〉〈2|)
P{UE((−1)k1 |1〉+ (−1)k2 |2〉)|E〉|F 〉}
+ P{UE|3〉|E〉|F 〉}],
(C1)
where, P{|x〉} = |x〉〈x|. From (C1), to analyze Eve’s
ancilla |E〉, Alice’s encoding state is equivalent to
a mixture of components P{(−1)k1 |1〉 + (−1)k2 |2〉}
and P{|3〉}. Evidently, in perfect case, the events
that Fred outputs 1 and 2 can only correspond to
that Alice emits (−1)k1 |1〉 + (−1)k2 |2〉. Further-
more, in perfect case, Fred’s operation U
(1)
F gen-
erates (−1)k1 |1〉 + (−1)k2 |2〉 without error, which
means
UE(|1〉+ |2〉)|E〉 = |F12+〉|E12+〉,
UE(|1〉 − |2〉)|E〉 = |F12−〉|E12−〉,
(C2)
and
U
(1)
F |F12+〉 = |1〉+ |2〉,
U
(1)
F |F12−〉 = |1〉 − |2〉.
(C3)
On the other hand, when r = 2, and Fred outputs 1
and 3, we have
UE(|1〉+ |3〉)|E〉 = |F13+〉|E13+〉,
UE(|1〉 − |3〉)|E〉 = |F13−〉|E13−〉,
(C4)
and
U
(2)
F |F13+〉 = |1〉+ |3〉,
U
(2)
F |F13−〉 = |1〉 − |3〉.
(C5)
Since unitary transformation UE , U
(1)
F , and U
(2)
F
must preserve inner product, it’s easy to find the
module of the product of |E13+〉 and |E13−〉 must
be 1, which implies that |E13+〉 and |E13−〉 can only
differ by a phase. Hence, Eve can not obtain any
information on k1⊕k3 through her ancilla |E〉. Sim-
ilarly, we can prove that Eve cannot learn k1 ⊕ k2
and k2 ⊕ k3.
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